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1. The problems 
After the Greek public debt crisis and the 
bilateral loans to Greece from the other members 
of the European Monetary Union (EMU), in May 
2010 the Ecofin Council launched the European 
Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM). In June 
of the same year the EMU countries instituted 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). 
These two mechanisms, which are charged with 
providing support to EMU countries in 
“exceptional difficulty”, received their baptism 
of fire with Ireland in January 2011 and 
successfully made their first bond issue on the 
market.  
In conjunction with the declarations in favour of 
the euro by German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
and French President Nicolas Sarkozy in Davos, 
the success of the issue stemmed the immediate 
risks of contagion and temporarily relieved the 
speculative pressure on European sovereign debt 
securities. With the partial exception of Ireland, 
between mid-January and the first few days of 
February the peripheral EMU countries saw the 
spreads on their government bond yields over 
those of Germany narrow (see Figure 1) and 
their credit default swap premiums diminish 
(Figure 2). And although the German proposal to 
link sovereign debt management and fiscal and 
macroeconomic coordination was met with a 
cold reception from several member states at the 
latest European Council meeting (on 4th 
February), the forthcoming meetings of the 
heads of state and government of the EMU and 
of the Eurogroup and the end-March European 
Council session promise to impart new impetus 
to sovereign debt management, the revision of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and the setting of 
macroeconomic competitiveness standards 
within the EMU.  
The solution of Europe’s sovereign debt 
problems cannot, however, be entrusted to the 
two stability funds, not even in tandem with the 
International Monetary Fund. The EFSF, the 
larger of the two, is not internal to the EMU but 
is an autonomous, special vehicle guaranteed on 
a proportional basis by the non-user member 
states. It can only intervene within the limits of 
Article 122 of the European Treaty – that is, only 
if a country is in difficulty due to exceptional 
reasons beyond its control – and without 
purchasing public debt securities. Furthermore, 
EFSF support will end in June 2013 when it will 
be replaced by the new European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), approved by the Eurogroup 
at the end of November and by the European 
Council in December.  
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Figure 1.Government bond spreads 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
 
But the ESM too appears inadequate to deal with 
the problems of European sovereign debt. 
Although ESM is a permanent crisis-
management mechanism and instituting it 
required a Treaty amendment, it looks to be 
modelled on the EFSF and to partake of or even 
to magnify many of its precursor’s limitations. 
The ESM’s field of action and organisational 
structure have yet to be defined in detail. As 
things now stand, notwithstanding the European 
Central Bank’s opinion to the contrary, it too will 
probably lack a mandate to purchase member 
states’ public securities.1 Like the EFSF, the ESM 
will intervene to support EMU members in 
                                                     
1 The European Central Bank risks remaining the sole 
European institution to buy public debt securities of 
the peripheral EMU countries. It made its first 
purchases in concomitance with the bilateral 
interventions in favour of Greece, thereby 
aggravating the deterioration in the quality of its 
balance sheet assets that had resulted from its 
generous open-market operations in support of the 
European banking sector since the initial phases of 
the financial crisis.  
difficulty for exceptional reasons, but unlike its 
predecessor, its loans will have seniority over 
any private creditor position and will thus tend 
to provoke crowding-out effects on private 
investments in sovereign bonds. In addition, the 
ESM will set the conditions for support to 
countries in difficulty and the degree of 
‘punishment’ to be meted out to private sector 
investors in those countries’ public bonds case 
by case, with extremely wide discretion and 
highly complex decision-making processes. 
Consequently, it will probably be condemned to 
carry out only emergency interventions, with 
maximum costs to providers and recipients 
alike.2 
                                                     
2 Amato et al. (2010) paint a more positive picture of 
the ESM, which they liken to a European Monetary 
Fund. On the other hand, Gros (2010) stresses that the 
seniority of the ESM’s claims sends a distortionary 
signal to the market in that it aggravates the risk of 
default on private claims with respect to the 
sovereign debt of the peripheral countries. This 
explains the possibility of crowding out.  
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Figure 2. Credit default swap (Cds) premiums  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
The current debate among the EMU member 
states, focusing on whether or not to raise the 
EFSF’s potential lending ceiling,3 does touch on 
important points to stem the crisis in the short 
run. But it offers no structural solution to the 
European sovereign debt problem. Such a 
solution would have to rest on at least three 
components: i) the creation of a European Debt 
Agency (EDA) within the EMU that supersedes 
the EFSF and ESM and buys member states’ 
government securities, enabling the European 
                                                     
3 In principle, the EFSF can issue up to €440 billion of 
liabilities, covered by a guarantee of the same amount 
allocated pro rata among all the EMU countries. But 
since only some member countries have AAA ratings 
and Greece and Ireland are excluded as direct or 
indirect beneficiaries of European financial support, 
reliable estimates put the EFSF’s effective lending 
capacity at under €300 billion. The member states are 
debating whether the pro rata guarantee ought to be 
increased to give the facility an effective lending 
capacity of €440 billion or even more. Meanwhile, the 
Eurogroup meeting of 14 February decided that the 
ESM’s initial operations (June 2013) will have an 
effective lending ceiling of €500 billion, subject to 
review every two years.  
Central Bank to free itself from its inevitable but 
improper stand-in role (see footnote 1); ii) the 
involvement of all the EMU countries in 
providing a comprehensive joint guarantee on 
the bonds issued by the EDA;4 iii) the setting of 
systematic rules and, when possible, market 
rules for the organisation of the EDA’s 
transactions. Plainly, putting these elements in 
place would create a market for European public 
bonds (eurobonds).  
                                                     
4 As Favero and Missale (2010) point out, unlike a pro 
rata guarantee, a comprehensive joint guarantee 
aligns the valuation of the counterparty risk with the 
prevailing valuation for the corresponding securities 
issued by the ‘strongest’ guarantor. In the case in 
question, the valuation of the new European public 
debt securities should therefore be aligned with that 
of the corresponding German securities. This point is 
disputed by commentators who insist on the close 
correlation of sovereign debts in the peripheral 
countries. Nevertheless, empirical evidence shows 
that it is well within the capability of the EMU 
countries that have a triple-A rating to provide a 
comprehensive joint guarantee for all the public 
securities of the peripheral countries. Whether this is 
politically viable is another question (see Section 3). 
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2. A new solution 
Even if we consider the output of just the last 
few months, the literature on eurobonds is 
abundant.5 Here I draw on various proposals, 
selecting the elements that are consonant with 
the solution I intend to construct. 
The European Debt Agency can issue European 
sovereign debt securities worth up to 60% of the 
EMU’s GDP, so that its liabilities do not infringe 
the parameters of the European Stability and 
Growth Pact. These securities are fully and 
jointly guaranteed by all the EMU member 
states. With the full and joint guarantors 
including the countries that have a triple-A 
rating (Germany first and foremost), the EDA, 
unlike the EFSF, can attain its maximum 
issuance potential since it does not have to resort 
to over-collaterlisation in order to place its 
securities at market conditions in line with those 
of the ‘strongest’ EMU countries (see footnote 4). 
The EDA uses the resources so procured to 
purchase the debt securities of the individual 
EMU member states that elect to avail 
themselves of this opportunity. This presupposes 
the amendment of Article 125 of the European 
Treaty, which prohibits all bail-outs among the 
countries of the European Union. The supply of 
securities of the member states may come from 
two possible sources: the flows of the countries 
that prefer to resort to the EDA rather than to tap 
the market for new issues, and (part of) the stock 
held by investors who are ready to sell at a given 
price. 
                                                     
5 See, among others, De Grauwe and Moses (2009), 
Delpla and Weizsäcker (2010), Gros and Mayer (2011), 
Juncker and Tremonti (2010), Messori (2010), and 
Monti (2010a and 2010b). Gianviti et al. (2010) have 
developed a different solution to the European 
sovereign debt problem. They propose creating a 
European Crisis Resolution Mechanism to restructure the 
debt of EMU countries found to be insolvent or on the 
verge of insolvency. Restructuring, agreed between 
the debtor country and its creditors, would be 
intended to restore the solvency of the country’s 
sovereign debt and commit the country to fiscal 
discipline in the future in exchange for financial 
assistance from other member states. The complex 
restructuring procedures would be handled by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union.  
To obviate the need for the EDA to equip itself 
with the ‘technologies’ to operate in the retail 
markets, each member state is assumed here to 
act as intermediary for the transactions involving 
stocks of its own sovereign securities. Further, 
the actual price at which a country’s securities 
are sold to the EDA is equal to the price at which 
that country buys back the stock of its own 
securities. These two assumptions, which 
preclude shifting (part of) the cost deriving from 
the discount at which the securities are sold to 
the EDA from the member states onto investors, 
mark a difference between our proposal and that 
of Gros and Mayer (2011). The latter envisages a 
complex procedure for renegotiation between 
the European agency, whose direct purchases 
include purchases from the privately-held stock, 
and the member states in difficulty.6 The 
renegotiation, which does not apply to private 
creditors, makes it possible to mitigate the 
haircut for countries ready to undertake a fiscal 
consolidation programme. It should be noted, 
finally, that the approach proposed here also 
assumes that the maximum demand price (pd) set 
by the EDA for member states’ securities 
coincides with the price at which its eurobonds 
are placed on the market. 
In 2010 the debt/GDP ratio of the EMU countries 
averaged about 84%. Consequently, the potential 
demand for member states’ securities from the 
EDA, whose ceiling in value is 60% of the EMU’s 
GDP, is lower than the maximum potential 
supply. On the other hand, for the reasons 
already given, the EDA is able to place its own 
securities on far better market terms than the 
weaker EMU countries. This is an ideal situation 
for organising the transactions between the EDA 
and the member states through the mechanism 
of the “non-uniform price reverse auction”. For 
the sake of simplicity, in what follows it will be 
assumed that each EMU country issues only a 
single type of public debt bond. This 
simplification is justified by the considerable 
standardization of the national markets in 
government securities within the EMU. 
                                                     
6 Another important difference is that in Gross-Mayer 
proposal purchases are limited to countries already 
financed by the EFSF or about to be. This explains 
why it is assumed that the transactions are conducted 
at the pre-crisis market prices of those countries’ 
government securities.  
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Moreover this hypothesis could be refined, 
without undue complication, by assuming that a 
single linear vector of public debt securities is 
issued. 
The EDA opens the auction, setting the 
maximum quantity (Qd) and maximum price (pd) 
of its demand for member states’ bonds, pd being 
equal to the market price of its own eurobonds. 
Each of the 17 EMU countries that wants to sell 
its newly issued bonds to the EDA and/or has 
signed buyback contracts with the holders of the 
stock of its bonds that are contingent on the 
success of its participation in the reverse auction 
simultaneously sets the minimum price (psi; 
where i=1, 2, …, n; with n ≤ 17) at which it is 
willing to sell those bonds and the quantity 
offered (qsi). Obviously, participation in the 
auction requires psi ≤ pd. However, it is possible 
(and probable) that at the n supply prices thus 
set, the quantity of bonds offered will exceed the 
EDA’s predetermined maximum demand (that is 
to say ∑qsi > Qd)). If this is the case, the order of 
access to transactions with the EDA is inverse to 
the supply price set by each of the n member 
states. In other words: the country that set the 
lowest price is the first to sell to the EDA the 
desired quantity offered at the price it has set. 
The auction ends when the actual transactions 
reach the maximum quantity that the EDA has 
undertaken to demand. The last country to have 
access to transactions with the EDA is thus the 
one to get the highest price, but it at the risk of 
not selling the entire quantity offered. Countries 
that have set even higher supply prices are 
closed out.  
Thus, the member countries’ participation in the 
reverse auction is voluntary, but, assuming 
rational behaviour, the auction design is 
extremely attractive for all the peripheral 
countries that the markets deem to be illiquid or 
even on the brink of insolvency, but not for the 
‘strong’ countries. The latter countries and the 
holders of their securities will decline to apply 
any discount or anything more than a symbolic 
discount to the supply price of these securities 
with respect to the market price (pd) of the 
eurobonds. Consequently, the peripheral 
countries and the holders of their securities can 
crowd out the securities of the stronger countries 
and have a very good chance of transferring all 
their sovereign debt to the EDA at a modest, 
though more than symbolic, discount to the 
supply prices of their securities. The “non-
uniform price reverse auction” will thus make it 
possible to sell the peripheral countries’ public 
securities to the EDA at prices not much lower 
than those obtained before the illiquidity or 
quasi-insolvency crisis. In other words, it will 
permit a restructuring of the sovereign debt of 
the peripheral countries of the EMU at a 
‘moderate’ cost.7 
A simple empirical check allows us to sharpen 
and strengthen this conclusion. The data on 
public debt and GDP in the EMU show that if the 
EDA immediately set the amount Qd at its ceiling 
(that is, given pd, at a level corresponding to the 
60% of the EMU’s GDP), it could readily absorb 
the entire end-2010 stock of public debt securities 
of the member states rated lower than AAA, plus 
all their new issues planned for 2011 and 2012. 
Alternatively it could almost be in a position to 
purchase the entire end-2010 stock of public debt 
securities of all the EMU countries except 
Germany (see Table 1). This implies that, in 
principle, all the peripheral countries could sell 
the entire stock of their sovereign debt to the 
EDA at prices not too squeezed by competition. 
In particular, each of the member states with 
illiquidity problems or on the brink of insolvency 
would apply that discount to the supply price of 
its securities, which narrows the current spreads 
of its public bond yields over those of Germany 
but, at the same time, minimizes the probability 
of being (even partially) left out of the reverse 
auction. 
 
                                                     
7 Darvas et al. (2011) propose a different way of 
restructuring European sovereign debt at “moderate” 
cost. The starting point of their analysis is the 
interdependence between the severe balance sheet 
problems in part of the European banking sector and 
the sovereign debt crisis, and therefore involves a 
larger set of variables. It would be interesting to see if 
the reverse auction mechanism described here can be 
incorporated in this more general and even harder-to-
execute approach.  
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Table 1. 
Country Public debt/gdp 2010 Country public debt/ total emu debt (2010) 
Euro area 84% 100% 
Germany 76% 24,58% 
Euro area – ‘AAA’ countries 76% 54,64% 
Austria 71% 2,57% 
Finland 50% 1,15% 
France 84% 21,22% 
Luxembourg 20% 0,10% 
Netherlands 66% 5,02% 
‘AAA’ countries without Germany 76% 30,06% 
Belgium 100% 4,57% 
Cyprus 61% 0,14% 
Estonia 8% 0,01% 
Greece 134% 3,97% 
Ireland 93% 1,89% 
Italy 119% 23,79% 
Malta 67% 0,05% 
Portugal 83% 1,83% 
Slovenia 34% 0,15% 
Slovak republic 42% 0,36% 
Spain 63% 8,60% 
Euro area – non ‘AAA’ countries 96% 45,36% 
Euro area without Germany 85% 75,42 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
3. Why would Germany agree? 
Table 1 highlights at least two advantages of the 
reverse auction mechanism described here. 
Unlike the proposal put forward by Depla and 
Weizsäcker (2010), it does not limit the 
peripheral EMU countries to converting only 
some of their securities (‘blue bonds’) into 
eurobonds and require them to hold their 
remaining securities (‘red bonds’) in the old 
national form. The separation of blue from red 
bonds would segment the financial markets and 
in the end merely alter the composition of 
European sovereign debt (Gros, 2011). In the 
reallocation, for most of the peripheral countries 
the gains from the blue bonds (lower interest 
rates and reduced illiquidity and default risks) 
could easily be more than offset by deterioration 
in the standing of the red bonds. Moreover, with 
the reverse auction mechanism and, given the 
size of the public debt within the EMU, the 
peripheral countries and their bondholders will 
be subjected to modest and converging haircuts, 
sufficient to curb moral hazard but not lapsing 
into the mystique of ‘punishing’ rash private 
investors (De Grauwe, 2011). 
This plan will thus apparently let the EMU 
countries ‘live together happily ever after’ even 
though – unlike many fairy tales and some 
policy proposals – it avoids unrealistic 
provisions for a free lunch. But to specify the 
actual functioning of the “non-uniform price 
reverse auction”, a series of other crucial 
questions need to be answered. The three most 
important may be: what to do with the profits 
that the EDA will inevitably earn by reason of 
the positive if modest spreads between the 
market price of European sovereign debt and the 
auction prices of the peripheral member states’ 
bonds? What reason would Germany have for 
offering a comprehensive guarantee for a 
mechanism that it is most unlikely ever to use? 
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And what would keep the peripheral countries, 
once they have transferred their previous public 
finance imbalances to a European agency, from 
again behaving as de la Fontaine’s cigale and 
thus becoming a source of instability? 
The best answer to the first question is that the 
EDA should channel its profits, after its 
operating costs and its transaction costs, to a 
fund for European tangible and intangible 
infrastructure.8 The alternative espoused by Gros 
and Mayer (2011) – returning at least a part to 
the member states that ‘punished’ investors by 
setting a low price for selling their paper to the 
EDA and that agree to a fiscal consolidation 
programme – would create distortions in the 
reverse auction framework itself. And as our 
third question also highlights, it fails to resolve 
the problem of providing an incentive for the 
peripheral countries to share a set of fiscal and 
macroeconomic policy rules compatible with 
growth. 
The second question goes to the heart of the 
matter, raising again the problem of fiscal 
discipline, but from a different angle. In fact, the 
comprehensive joint guarantee offered by the 
strong members that underpins our reverse 
auction framework requires Germany to take on 
a good portion of the weaker members’ fiscal 
risk, with no evident benefits in return. I do not 
presume to prove conclusively that this is not so. 
But I shall name six likely advantages for 
Germany in the conversion of peripheral 
countries sovereign debt into eurobonds. 
First: This conversion would create a large 
market for European sovereign debt securities, 
which, suitably combined with the market for 
German Bunds, would reduce liquidity risk 
within the EMU and enhance the euro’s 
international role, giving Germany leadership of 
a currency area strengthened as a world player. 
Second: The comprehensive joint guarantee for 
EDA issues would align the new European 
bonds’ rating with that of the German Bund, 
thus relieving the European Central Bank of the 
burden (borne unwillingly by German policy-
makers) of buying the public debt of the 
                                                     
8 The idea of eurobonds to fund infrastructure 
construction goes back to the Delors Committee in 
1993. It has been taken up again recently by Monti 
(2010a) and Amato et al. (2010). 
peripheral members and loading up its balance 
sheet with high-risk assets. Third: the modest 
haircuts applied to the peripheral countries 
public securities would have a tolerable impact 
on the balance sheets of the German and other 
European banks which hold a large amount of 
these securities, thus eliminating the need for 
new and costly state interventions. Fourth: 
resolution of the acute aspects of the sovereign 
debt crisis would end the need for ad hoc 
interventions in support of EMU countries on the 
brink of insolvency, which are costly for all EMU 
members, including Germany. Fifth: this would 
also ease the recession in the weaker countries, 
and facilitate those structural reforms at national 
level that are essential to attenuate the worst 
intra-EMU imbalances and so strengthen 
Germany’s role as leader of an economically 
dynamic area. Sixth, and crucially: combined 
with suitably reformed European governance, 
the EDA could give Germany a decisive say in 
setting the new rules for the EMU and EU.  
All that needs be done to implement this last 
point is to give each member state powers of 
decision in inverse proportion to the volume of 
public debt that it sells to the EDA. Thus, if 
Germany were the only large country not to 
convert its public debt securities into European 
debt, its leadership would stand fully 
acknowledged. Besides, this leadership could be 
exerted on the crucial components of EU’s new 
governance: the revision of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the definition of macroeconomic 
coordination standards within the Union, and 
the working of the micro-prudential and macro-
prudential supervision at European level. 
The strengthened German leadership in the new 
European governance points to an answer to our 
third question. In this way EMU’s peripheral 
countries would credibly demonstrate their 
acceptance of fiscal and macroeconomic 
discipline; and, on the other hand, Germany 
would not be forced to go too far in setting its 
desired European discipline standards just for 
bargaining reasons. Moreover, the reverse 
auction mechanism and the EDA’s ceiling (that 
is, the 60% of the EMU’s GDP) would remain 
operative through time so that the peripheral 
countries would have to limit their future issues 
of securities to avoid either an increase in the 
discount to the supply prices of these securities, 
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or an increased probability of being left out of 
the reverse auction. 
The framework set out here would enjoy the 
twofold advantage of dispensing with any 
distortion-inducing linkage between the 
formation of the peripherals’ bond prices and the 
design of reliable mechanisms for 
macroeconomic and fiscal discipline, while at the 
same time safeguarding strict linkage on the 
plane of effective realization. On the other hand, 
by entrusting discipline to governance 
mechanisms, this framework would maintain a 
degree of flexibility to prevent macroeconomic 
and fiscal coordination from turning into an 
insurmountable obstacle to the growth of EMU’s 
peripheral countries. 
___________________________________________ 
References 
Amato, G., Baldwin, R., Gros, D., Micossi, S. e 
P.C. Padoan (2010), “A renewed political 
deal for sustainable growth within the 
Eurozone and the EU”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 
227/7 December. 
Darvas, Z., Pisani-Ferry, J., A. Sapir (2011), “A 
comprehensive approach to the euro-area 
debt crisis”, Bruegel Policy Brief, 02, February. 
De Grauwe, P. (2011), “A less punishing, more 
forgiving approach to the debt crisis in the 
Eurozone”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 
230/January. 
De Grauwe, P., W. Moses (2009), “Gains for all: 
A proposal for a common eurobond”, CEPS 
Commentary, 3 April. 
Depla, J., J. von Weizsäcker (2010), “The blue 
bond proposal”, Bruegel Policy Brief, May. 
Favero, C.A., A. Missale (2010), “EU public debt 
management and eurobonds”, in Euro area 
governance. Ideas from crisis management 
reform, DG Internal Policies, Brussels. 
Gianviti, F., Krueger, A.O., Pisani-Ferry, J., Sapir, 
A., J. Von Hagen (2010), A European 
mechanism for sovereign debt crisis resolution: A 
proposal, Bruegel Blueprint Series, Bruegel. 
Gros, D. (2011), “Europe’s futile search for 
cheaper money”, CEPS Commentary, 11 
February. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gros, D. (2010), “The seniority conundrum: Bail 
out countries but bail in private, short-term 
creditors?”, CEPS Commentary, 6 December. 
Gros, D., T. Mayer (2011), “Debt reduction 
without default?”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 
233/February. 
Juncker, J.C., G. Tremonti (2010), “Euro wide 
bonds would help to end the crisis”, 
Financial Times, 6 December. 
Messori, M. (2010), “La rete di protezione”, 
Corriere della sera, 7 December. 
Monti, M. (2010a), A new strategy for the single 
market. At the service of Europe’s economy and 
society, Report to the President of the 
European Commission, 9 May. 
Monti, M. (2010b), “Titoli europei in aiuto 
all’euro”, Corriere della sera, 2 December. 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, Place du Congrès 1, B‐1000 Brussels, Belgium  
Tel: 32 (0)2 229 39 11 • Fax: 32 (0)2 219 41 51 • www.ceps.eu • VAT: BE 0424.123.986 
 
 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is widely recognised as 
the most experienced and authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS 
acts as a leading forum for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research 
capacity, complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
• Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the challenges 
facing Europe today, 
• Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
• Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
• Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
• Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
• Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
• An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 
